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SUMMARY
Vaccination can be a useful tool for the control of avian inﬂuenza (AI) outbreaks, but its use is
prohibited in most of the countries worldwide because of its interference with AI surveillance
tests and its negative impact on poultry trade. AI vaccines currently in use in the ﬁeld increase
host resistance to the disease but have a limited impact on the virus transmission. To control or
eradicate the disease, a carefully conceived vaccination strategy must be accompanied by strict
biosecurity measures. Some countries have authorized vaccination under special circumstances
with contradictory results, from control and disease eradication (Italy) to endemicity and
antigenic drift of the viral strain (Mexico). Extensive vaccination programmes are ongoing in
South East Asia to control the H5N1 epidemic. This review provides practical information on the
available AI vaccines and associated diagnostic tests, the vaccination strategies applied in Asia
and their impact on the disease epidemiology.
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INTRODUCTION
The control and eradication of highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) have so far relied on the
stamping-out of infected animals and biosecurity
measures including quarantine, surveillance and hy-
giene. Strategies for the control of low pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza (LPAI) viruses have varied from no
action to control with vaccination [1]. However, AI
vaccination is prohibited or not used in most AI-
aﬀected countries (Table 1). To limit the risk of in-
troducing the disease, the exportation of vaccinated
animals was prohibited because up to recently it was
impossible to diﬀerentiate infected from vaccinated
animals [2].
H5N1 HPAI outbreaks have occurred in both wild
and domestic birds in some Asian countries including
People’s Republic of China (P.R. China), Vietnam and
Indonesia, andmillions of birds which might represent
the only source of food supply and/or income for
many households in developing countries have been
culled. Measures such as culling, stamping-out, clean-
ing and disinfection that have been eﬀective in Europe
have not been successful in eradicating the disease in
Asia [3]. The World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) and the United Nation’s Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) do not recommend mass culling
in developing countries because such a practice is no
longer acceptable for ‘ethical, ecological and econ-
omic reasons ’ [4]. Moreover, more countries are at a
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high risk of H5N1 introduction due to the existence of
commercial routes and migratory waterfowl ﬂyways
between South East Asia, the Middle East, the Far
East and Europe [5–7]. However, the potential role
of migratory birds in spreading the H5N1 virus re-
mains controversial [8, 9]. Emergency (e.g. ring vacci-
nation during an outbreak), preventive (e.g. at-risk
birds or speciﬁc zone, free of disease or epidemic
situation) or prophylactic vaccination (e.g. mass vac-
cination in an endemic situation), currently allowed in
some countries (Table 1) should be used with eﬀective
biosecurity measures and thorough surveillance and
tracing systems to better control and/or eradicate AI
outbreaks [10]. The aim of the present study is to
present practical information on the AI vaccination
campaigns which have been implemented to date in
developing countries, especially in South East Asia,
covering the type of vaccine used, the vaccination
strategy followed, the associated biosecurity measures
and the outcome of each vaccination programme. The
state of the art on AI vaccines and vaccination strat-
egies will be described in the ﬁrst two sections, with a
focus on constraints of using AI vaccination in de-
veloping countries. For more in-depth information
on methods to control AI and on the immunology
behind AI vaccines, see the recent review by Capua &
Marangon [11].
AVIAN VACCINES
The ideal vaccine should be potent, safe, stable at
room temperature, administered in a single dose and
cheap. It should also enable diﬀerentiation between
vaccinated and infected animals (DIVA). None of the
AI vaccines currently licensed in the ﬁeld meet all
these requirements (Table 2).
There are currently two types of AI vaccines in use:
inactivated whole AI virus (AIV) vaccine and live
recombinant vaccines [12]. Table 3 presents a non-
exhaustive list of AI vaccines available on the market
with information on their eﬃcacy and reference to
laboratory and/or ﬁeld validation.
Their protective eﬃcacy relies on the production of
neutralizing antibodies against the haemagglutinin
(HA) protein of a speciﬁc subtype of avian inﬂuenza
virus (AIV) [13]. The minimum onset of protective
immunity conferred by an inactivated vaccine begins
2 weeks post-vaccination [3, 14–16] and could last
up to 1 year post-immunization [17, 18]. In order to
confer long-term protection (from 4months to 1 year),
between two and four injections, at a minimum of
Table 1. Vaccination status of countries infected
with H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus
Country
Oﬃcial vaccination status
(practical application)
Afghanistan Unknown (not in use)
Albania Prohibited
Azerbaijan Prohibited
Burkina Faso Authorized (not in use)
Cambodia Unknown (not in use)
Cameroon Unknown
P.R. China Authorized (in use)
Ivory Coast Authorized (not in use)
Egypt Authorized (in use)
France Authorized for preventive vaccination
on selected birds (in use)
Germany Prohibited
Hong Kong
(SARPRC)
Authorized (in use)
India Authorized for emergency
vaccination (not in use)
Indonesia Authorized (in use)
Iraq Prohibited
Israel Prohibited Exception for
endangered species and in use for
ostrich farms (EC/94/2004)
Japan Prohibited
Jordan Authorized (not in use)
Kazakhstan Prohibited
Korea
(Republic of)
Prohibited
Laos Unknown (not in use)
Malaysia
(peninsular)
Prohibited
Myanmar Unknown (not in use)
Netherlands Authorized for preventive
vaccination on selected birds (in use)
Niger Authorized (not in use)
Nigeria Prohibited (but illegal use suspected)
Palestinian
Autonomous
Territories
Prohibited
Pakistan Authorized (not in use)
Romania Authorized (not in use)
Russia Authorized for emergency vaccination
around outbreaks (in use)
Serbia and
Montenegro
Prohibited
Sudan Authorized (not in use)
Sweden Prohibited
Switzerland Authorized for preventive vaccination
on selected birds (in use)
Thailand Prohibited
Turkey Prohibited
Ukraine Prohibited
Vietnam Authorized (in use)
Less than 50% of contaminated countries are authorizing
vaccination as a control tool and less than 30% have
started using it. [Source : OIE: (http://www.oie.int/downld/
AVIAN%20INFLUENZA/A_AI-Asia.htm), January 2007.]
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3 weeks apart, are recommended depending on
vaccine type and targeted species (manufacturers’ rec-
ommendations [17, 19–21] ; Table 3). This represents a
great limitation for countries with a huge proportion
of backyard poultry diﬃcult to vaccinate at multiple
times (e.g. P.R. China, Indonesia, and Vietnam). Only
recombinant vaccines [reverse genetics (RG) H5N1
and H5N3, H5 fowlpox and H5 NDV] are able to
confer protection after single dose (Table 3) : the live
fowlpox recombinant vaccine can even confer early
and long-lasting protection after a single dose, from
20–40 weeks [22, 23]. However, its practical use is
limited to fowlpox-free chickens (i.e. young birds) as
the immune response is impaired if animals have pre-
viously been infected with fowlpox virus [1, 24]. All
current commercial AI vaccines are for parenteral ad-
ministration only; research on new delivery routes
(oral or in ovo) is ongoing [25, 26] ; with the exception
of the H5 AI-NDV vaccine from P.R. China (oculo-
nasal administration) [27], although limited infor-
mation on its ﬁeld application (P.R. China only) is
available.
Inactivated whole virus vaccines
Conventional AI vaccines are produced with whole
AIV of a speciﬁc subtype grown in embryonating
chicken eggs (infective allantoic ﬂuid). The grown
viruses are chemically inactivated by b-propiolactone
or formaline, adjuvanted with mineral oil (e.g. paraf-
ﬁn) [10].
Inactivated AI vaccines are either homologous or
heterologous, depending on the choice of the viral
strain. The homologous type is prepared from epi-
demic isolates or standard strains possessing the same
HA and neuraminidase (NA) subtypes of the circu-
lating ﬁeld virus. The heterologous type has the same
HA subtype as the circulating wild virus but a diﬀer-
ent NA subtype. The use of heterologous vaccines
could allow the diﬀerentiation of infected animals
from vaccinated animals (DIVA strategy). However,
this is not relevant for H5N1-infected developing
countries where the ﬁrst priority is to control the in-
fection [3].
Recombinant vaccines
Recombinant vaccines are based on the expression of
an AIV gene of interest after insertion into a carrier
vector (no pathogenic virus). Only three recombinant
vaccines are currently licensed and in use (although
numerous vaccines based on vectors such as baculo-
virus and retrovirus are under experimental develop-
ment). (i) The fowlpox recombinant AI vaccine, this is
based on the insertion of a gene coding for a speciﬁc
HA subtype (H5 and H7) into the fowlpox virus
(Table 3). This vaccine could confer long-term pro-
tection of up to 24 weeks, after a single adminis-
tration, however, no protection is obtained if birds
were previously infected with fowlpox virus [28]. The
eﬃcacy of the fowlpox recombinant vaccine against
the H5 subtype was well reviewed by Swayne [1] and is
being used on 1-day-old chicks in P.R. China, Mexico
and Vietnam [22]. (ii) The recombinant H5N1 vaccine
is based on RG technology [29] (Table 3). Circulating
strains of HPAI H5N1 viruses are too pathogenic to
be grown in the laboratory for vaccine production. A
LPAI H5N1 reassortant virus was generated using
HA and NA genes from the circulating HPAI H5N1
strain and six internal genes from a low pathogenic
Table 2. Review of the advantages and limits of avian inﬂuenza vaccines currently licensed on the market
against criteria for an ideal vaccine
Ideal vaccine
Homologous
inactivated
(e.g. H5N1)
Heterologous
inactivated
(e.g. H5N2)
Recombinant
Fowlpox
(e.g. H5)
Recombinant
(e.g. RG H5N1)
Recombinant
AI/ND (e.g. H5/ND)
Pure/safe/potent +/+/+ +/+/¡ +/+/¡ +/+/¡ +/¡/¡
Thermo stable No No No No Yes/No*
Single dose No (2–3 doses) No (2–3 doses) Yes (yearly) Yes/No (2–3 doses) Yes/No (every 4 months)
Easy administration
(oral/mucosal)
No: injection No: injection No: injection No: injection Yes: eye drop
DIVA No Yes Yes Yes/No Yes
Cheap From 0.01 to 0.05 US$/dose (in 2007), the price varies according to the manufacturing country
(European vaccines are more expensive than Asian vaccines)
RG, Reverse genetics ; AI, avian inﬂuenza; ND, Newcastle disease; DIVA, diﬀerentiation of infected from vaccinated
animals.
* Depending on the ND virus strain.
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Table 3. Experimental validation of commercial inactivated and recombinant avian inﬂuenza vaccines
Vaccine subtype
HA content
(mg/dose) Species*
HI titres#
(log2) Challenge strain
Protection$
(% birds)
Viral shedding
(EID50/ml) Ref.
H5N1 (R) A/Goose/
Guangdong/1/96
2.8 Chickens (3 wk) 10 H5N1 (A/Goose/
Guangdong/1/96)
100 Oral up to 3 dpi [18, 31]
Harbin Veterinary
Institute
>4 (40 wk pv) No cloacal
(China) 4.6 Geese (3 wk, 10 (35 wk pv) H5N1 (DKSH/04) 100 No shedding 3 wk pv [18, 31]
13.8 4 wk, 17 wk)
4.6 Ducks 10 (52 wk pv) H5N1 (DKSH/04) 100 Oral and cloacal
shedding up to 7 dpi
[18, 31]
9.2 (3 wk, 14 wk)
H5N2 (I) A/CK/mexico/
232/94/CPA
— Chickens 7–8 H5N2 (A/chicken/
Puebla/8623-607/94)
100 Tracheal reduced by 101 [54]
Avimex (Mexico)
(2 wk, 4 wk)
H5N2 (I) 0.08 Chickens (3 wk,
6 wk)
8–9 H5N2 (A/chicken/
Indonesia/7/03)
100 Cloacal and tracheal
reduced by 104–5
[45]
A/CK/mexico/232/94/CPA
H5N2 (I) 1.2 Chickens 8–9 H5N1 (A/CK/HK/86.3/02) 90–100 Pos. for cloacal, tracheal,
contact transmission
[44]
A/CK/mexico/232/94/CPA
(1 wk, 5 wk)
Intervet (The Netherlands) — Chickens 6–7 H5N1 (A/CK/HK/
2002)
100 Cloacal and tracheal
reduced by 103–4
[38]
(ﬁeld validation)
— Chickens (7 wk) — H5N1 (A/chicken/ 80 No reduction in transmission
when challenge 1 wk pv
[101]
(single dose) GxLA/1204/04) (1 wk pv)
H5N2 (I) 0.0125 Chickens 9–10 H5N2 (A/chicken/
Indonesia/7/03)
90 Cloacal and thracheal
reduced by 104–5
[45]
A/duck/postdam/1402/86 (3 wk, 6 wk)
Intervet (The Netherlands) — Pekin ducks 7.69 H5N1 (A/duck/
Vietnam/12/05)
100 No shedding [20]
(DO, 4 wk) (>4 up to
4 months pv)
H5N3 (R) 0.25–1.2 Chickens >11 H5N1 (A/Chicken/
Vietnam/C58/04)
86–100 Pos. tracheal until day 5 [21]
Poulvac i-AI (2 wk, 5 wk) Neg. cloacal
A/Chicken/Vietnam/C58/04
(H5N1)
0.25–1.2 Pekin ducks >7 H5N1 (A/Duck/
Thailand/71.1/04)
100 No shedding and protection
up to 4 months pv
[21]
A/Duck/Germany/1215/73
(H2N3)
(2 wk, 5 wk)
Fort dodge sante animale
(Wyeth)
(USA) 0.25–1.2 Pekin ducks >6 H5N1 (A/Duck/
Thailand/71.1/04)
100 No shedding [21]
(2 wk) (single dose)
Pekin ducks 3–6 H5N1 (A/Muscovy
duck/Vietnam/
453/2004)
100 No shedding [102]
(DO, 3 wk)
4
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Table 3 (cont.)
Vaccine subtype
HA content
(mg/dose) Species*
HI titres#
(log2) Challenge strain
Protection$
(% birds)
Viral shedding
(EID50/ml) Ref.
0.25 Khaki Campbell >9 H5N1 (A/Duck/
Thailand/71.1/04)
100 No shedding [21]
ducks (2 wk,
4 wk)
No contact transmission
H5N3 (R) 1.2 Chickens 6.5–8.5 H5N1 (A/CK/HK/
86.3/02)
100 Reduction in shedding and
infectiousness
[44]
A/Goose/HK/437.4/99
(H5N1)
(1–2 wk) (single dose)
A/Duck/Germany/
1215/73 (H2N3)
H5N9-it (I) — Muscovy ducks
(5 wk, 7 wk)
7.5 H5N1 (A/crestedeagle/
Belgium/01/2004)
100 Reduction>102 [46]
(H5N9/H7N1 BIO FLU) Cloacal until day 3,
oral until day 9
A/CK/Italy/22A/98 — Chickens 5.6 H5N1 (A/Chicken/
Supranburi/2/04)
100 Reduction oral shedding by 101.6.
No detectable cloacal shedding
[43]
Merial (France) (3 wk) (single dose)
H5N9-WI (I) — Chickens 7.3 H5N1 (A/Chicken/
Supranburi/2/04)
90 Reduction oral shedding by 102.3 [43]
Gallimune Flu (3 wk) (single dose) Cloacal by>103
A/turkey/Wisconsin/68
Merial (France)
H5N9 (I) — Chickens 10.3 H5N1 (A/chicken/
Yamaguchi/7/2004)
100 Neg. for virus isolation [50]
(Layermune) (3 wk, 7 wk) Pos. only by
RT–PCR
until day 14
A/turkey/Wisconsin/68
(cloacal and
tracheal)
Biomune (Ceva) (USA)
H5N9/H7N1 (I) Pekin ducks 2–3 H5N1 (A/Muscovy
duck/Vietnam/453/
2004)
100 Cloacal and oral shedding
up to 4 dpi
[43]
Poulvac (DO, 3 wk)
A/CK/Italy/22A/98 (H5N9)
A/CK/Italy/1067/1999
(H7N1)
Fort Dodge (Australia)
H7N1 (I)
A/CK/Italy/473/99
22.5 Chickens
(6 wk)
8–9 up to
1 month pv
(single dose)
H7N7 (A/Chickens/
Netherlands/621557/03)
100% Neg virus isolation [16]
No transmission 2 wk pv
— Zoo birds 7–8 H7N7 (A/Chickens/
Netherlands/1/03)
— Transmission from poultry to
other avian species
[36]
H7N1 — Turkeys 6–7 H7N3 (LPAI) 100 Reduces infectiousness by 102–4 [14]
A/ty/Italy/99 (1 wk, 4 wk, 7 wk) A/ty/Italy/8000/02
H7N3
A/Chicken/Pakistan/95
Intervet
6.5 Chickens (6 wk) 6–7 H7N7 (A/Chickens/
Netherlands/621557/03)
100 Neg virus isolation
No transmission 2 wk pv
[16]
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Table 3 (cont.)
Vaccine subtype
HA content
(mg/dose) Species*
HI titres#
(log2) Challenge strain
Protection$
(% birds)
Viral shedding
(EID50/ml) Ref.
Fowlpox H5 — Chickens 2.5 H5N1 (A/CK/
Vietnam/0008/2004)
100 Reduction 102.5–4.5 in oral and
cloacal shedding
[103]
(rFP-AIV-H5) (Trovac) (R) (DO) post-ch
(3 wk)=7.6
A/turkey/Ireland/1378/83
(H5N8)
— Chickens — 8 diﬀerent strains 100 Reduction 102–3 in oral and 101–2
in cloacal shedding
[51]
Merial (France)
(DO)
— Muscovy ducks 3 H5N1 (A/crested
eagle/Belgium/01/2004)
100 Reduction<102 cloacal
until day 6, oral until 9 dpi
[46]
(5 wk, 7 wk)
Fowlpox H5N1 — Chickens 3.58 (1 wk pv) H5N1 (A/Goose/
Guangdong/1/96)
100 No shedding [22]
(rFPV-HA-NA) (34 wk) 7 (2 wk pv)
A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96
(H5N1);
3–4 (40 wk pv)
Harbin Veterinary
Institute (China)
H5 NDV 0.16 Chickens (1 wk) >8 H5N1 (BHG/QH/O5) 100 No shedding [27]
A/Bar-headed goose/
Qinghai/3/2005
(mucosal route) (single dose)
(H5N1)
Lasota (NDV);
Harbin Veterinary
Institute (China)
>4 (16 wk pv) H5N1 (GS/GD/96) 100 No shedding
—, No information; AIV, avian inﬂuenza virus; CK, chicken; dpi, days post-infection; DO, day old; EID50, egg infectious dose (lethality 50%); FPV, fowlpox virus;
HA, haemagglutinin; HI, haemagglutinin inhibition; I, inactivated; NDV, Newcastle disease virus; neg., negative; pos., positive; post-ch, post-challenge; pv, post-
vaccination; R, recombinant; RT–PCR, reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction; wk, weeks.
* Age of vaccinated birds in weeks; parenteral vaccination (intra-muscular or subcutaneous) performed in laboratory animals unless mentioned otherwise.
# As measured between 2–4 weeks post-vaccination (unless mentioned otherwise) by OIE standard HI method [10].
$ Protection from clinical signs and mortality.
Note: This list is a non-exhaustive list and more details on producers from China, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and Pakistan may be found on public access websites (FAO: http://
www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/vaccine_producers.htm and http://poultrymed.com/ﬁles/index.html ; accessed May 2008).
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virus (e.g. PR8 virus) [18]. This vaccine was used in
Hong Kong and Korea in 2003 and is currently being
used in P.R. China, Vietnam and Indonesia. (iii) The
Newcastle disease (ND) recombinant AI vaccine
has been licensed and in use in P.R. China since
2006 (Table 3). This vaccine combines immunization
against AI and ND viruses [30–32].
Recombinant vaccines are of great interest for oral
or mucosal administration because of the ﬂexibility in
the choice of a vector suitable for these administration
routes [25]. However, in the case of the fowlpox vac-
cine, only limited protection is conferred using in-
tranasal, eye drop, or drinking-water administration
methods [33].
AI vaccine eﬃcacy
To ensure a successful vaccination campaign, the
vaccine must protect the vaccinated animals against
clinical signs of the disease and prevent mortality
(deﬁned as ‘protection’ in the following section); re-
duce virus shedding into the environment and in-
crease the minimum dose of virus required to infect a
bird, therefore limiting contact infection and spread
of the disease.
Immunological principles for AI vaccine protection
have been well reviewed recently [34], only practical
results from laboratory and ﬁeld validation will be
discussed here. A clear distinction should be made
between ﬁeld validation of the vaccine (pilot trial
under controlled ﬁeld conditions as opposed to lab-
oratory validation) and evaluation of the vaccination
campaign (post-vaccination monitoring). The ﬁeld
validation under controlled ﬁeld conditions by means
of experimental epidemiology will give information
on vaccine eﬃcacy according to potential limiting
factors associated with the vaccine itself (virus sero-
type and level of protection induced) and the bird/
ﬂock (maternal immunity, immunosuppresssion, san-
itary status. genetic factors) [35]. Whereas multiple
factors not directly linked to the vaccine or the ani-
mals could be interfering with the vaccine eﬃcacy
when evaluating a vaccination campaign (vaccine
administration; associated biosecurity measures;
awareness campaign, etc.) [35]. Evaluation of a vac-
cination campaign (post-vaccination monitoring
practices, coverage rate, level of seroconversion, virus
circulation) will be discussed later in the review.
Protection against AI is mostly conferred by the
production of antibodies against HA viral protein
[13, 34]. Therefore, the level of seroconversion in terms
of anti-HA antibodies [measured by haemagglutinin
inhibition (HI) test] is used to evaluate vaccine eﬃ-
cacy [2]. According to the OIE International Manual,
HI titres are considered positive when the inhibition
of the hemagglutination occurs for a serum dilution of
at least 16 (4 log2) against 4 haemagglutinin antigen
units (HAU) antigen [10]. To assess vaccine eﬃcacy,
some experimental studies [36] and ﬁeld vaccination
campaigns (Italy 2000–2002 [37], Hong Kong 2002
[38], Vietnam – ongoing since 2005 [39]) are following
the criteria deﬁned by the Committee for Proprietary
Medicinal products (CPMP) for validation of human
inﬂuenza vaccines, i.e. HI titres o40 (5–6 log2) in
o70% of the vaccinated population [40, 41]. How-
ever, the validity of those criteria in avian species
remains empirical. Regarding infection and contact
transmission, a minimum goal for reduction in viral
shedding has been deﬁned as 102-fold in order to re-
duce or prevent contact infection [42].
All the commercial vaccines have been validated in
the laboratory to meet those standards (with HI titres
in chickens : primary dose >5 log2 ; booster dose
>8 log2 [16, 18, 21, 43–45] ; see Table 3) and some
studies have shown a reduction in viral shedding
>103-fold in vaccinated chickens compared to un-
vaccinated birds following challenge with homolo-
gous and heterologous viral strains [14, 38, 43, 45] ; a
reduction of infectiousness and reduction of the birds’
susceptibility 2 weeks’ post-vaccination [14–16].
Although diﬀerences in HI titres could be observed
between vaccines (e.g. HI response in chickens against
H1N1 (11 log2) ; H5N1 (9 log2) ; H2N3 (8 log2) [44] ;
fowlpox vaccine does not induce very high level of
antibodies compared to H5N9-inactivated vaccine
[46]) ; and species (antibody response in ducks or tur-
keys could be lower than chickens [21, 47]), they all
confer very high level of protection against clinical
signs and mortality (90–100% protected birds).
A limited number of studies are available on the cor-
relation between serological titres and protection
against viral challenge. A direct relationship between
HI titres and protection has been demonstrated for
inactivated vaccines: Kumar et al. have shown that if
HI titres were<3.5 log2, chickens were not protected
against clinical signs and might die ; with titres be-
tween 3.5 log2 and 4.5 log2, no mortality was observed
but the animals will shed the virus and only with titres
>4.5 log2was no further viral shedding observed [48] ;
van der Goot et al. have shown that viral shedding
was reduced and transmission was prevented with HI
titres>4 log2 [16] ; and Lee et al. have shown that no
AI vaccines: ﬁeld application 7
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shedding was observed for HI titres >5 log2 [49].
Therefore experimental data conﬁrm the threshold
value of HI titres >4 log2, as deﬁned by the OIE
International Manual, to assess vaccine eﬃcacy in
terms of protection of the vaccinated animals [2]. The
link between serological titres and protection against
viral challenge is not so clear for recombinant vac-
cines : in a study from Webster and colleagues, Pekin
ducks vaccinated with low antigen doses of RGH5N3
(from 0.015 mg to 0.0313 mg) did not produce detect-
able HI antibody titres but were fully protected
against lethal challenge with H5N1 HPAI virus [21] ;
similar data have been shown for the H5 fowlpox
vectored recombinant vaccine which induces a very
low level of HI titres (<3 log2) but conferred full
protection to the vaccinated chickens [46]. However,
inconsistent or low HI antibody responses following
vaccination of chickens with the recombinant fowlpox
H5 vaccine could be linked with the antigen used in
theHI test (homologous or heterologous type)whereas
this is not the case for inactivated vaccines [28].
Inactivated AI vaccines might induce very high level
of HI titres before challenge which seems to prevent
morbidity and to some extent cloacal shedding, how-
ever, some studies have shown limited reduction
in oral shedding for vaccinated birds and therefore
risk of contact infection for unvaccinated birds [43,
45, 50].
Moreover, a limited cross-protection could occur
between heterologous and homologous vaccines.
According to the literature and manufacturers’
validation data, all the commercial AI vaccines tested
are able to confer 100% protection against exper-
imental challenge with homologous viruses and a
broad cross-protection exists with heterologous
strains [45, 46, 50–53]. However, discrepancies in viral
shedding (cloacal and tracheal) have been linked to
genetic variation between the vaccine and challenge
virus strains [54]. Some studies have demonstrated a
direct correlation between the HA sequence similarity
of the vaccine and challenge viruses and the ability of
the vaccine to reduce tracheal shedding [51, 54].
Lee et al. have also demonstrated that fourfold more
HI titres were required to protect vaccinated animals
against challenge with heterologous virus [49].
Moreover, Liu et al. demonstrated that despite the
high level of HI titres induced by commercial H5N2
vaccine, protection was not fully achieved following
challenge with high doses of H5N1 virus [44] which
highlights possible limits of heterologous vaccines in
terms of disease control and eradication.
Discrepancy between laboratory and ﬁeld results
have also been observed [55]. Such diﬀerences could
be linked to the immune status of the vaccinated birds
(immunosuppressive conditions and concurrent dis-
eases) and the practicalities of setting up a vaccination
campaign (technical issues related to vaccine storage
and administration). However, limited ﬁeld trial data
have been available so far and international and/or
national authorities should ensure that new vaccine
formulations are being validated in ﬁeld pilot studies
prior routine use in mass vaccination campaigns.
As the minimum requirements in terms of vaccine
eﬃcacy are not yet clearly deﬁned for laboratory ex-
periments it is still very diﬃcult to predict the mini-
mum required for a vaccine to be eﬃcient in
controlling the disease in the ﬁeld. Field validation
trials based on standard epidemiological protocols
(case-control or cohort studies) [56] are needed to as-
sess vaccine eﬃcacy according to speciﬁc epidemio-
logical and local context (type of poultry production,
species, type of circulating ﬁeld virus, other circu-
lating diseases and immune status of the animals,
etc.).
IMPLEMENTATION OF AI
VACCINATION
A basic rule to follow when implementing vaccination
against AI is that the use of vaccines is only one of
several tools to prevent or contain an outbreak
spreading in unaﬀected ﬂocks. Other eﬀective control
and biosecurity measures must be implemented in
addition to vaccination. Vaccination against HPAI
has proven to be a successful additional control
measure implemented alongside controlled culling in
Italy in 2000 (H7N1), in Mexico in 1995 (H5N2), and
in Pakistan in 2003 (H7N3) [17, 57, 58]. Hong Kong
was also successful in eradicating H5N1 AIV after the
2002 outbreak when implementing both vaccination
and strict biosecurity measures such as the ban of live
animal markets and the separation of ducks from
chickens on production farms [15].
Stamping-out vs. vaccination
Until recently, mass culling of animals was the most
eﬃcient measure of preventing the spread of AI epi-
demics. After a H5N1 AIV outbreak in Hong Kong in
1997, mass culling of all poultry animals was per-
formed within a few days and this measure prevented
the spreading of the virus at that time [59]. However,
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since 2003, the H5N1 epidemic has spread too far
worldwide to be contained only with a stamping-out
policy which would imply mass culling of millions of
more birds. In most of the infected countries in Asia
poultry rearing represents the main source of income
and many households own backyard poultry. Most of
the infection of backyard poultry (or even small
farms) goes unnoticed and sick poultry are quickly
sold to the local market [60], helping the virus to
spread rapidly. The delay in putting in place measures
such as awareness programmes and compensation
schemes by the competent authorities along with
limited level of biosecurity and local commercial
practices (e.g. live bird markets) has greatly facilitated
the spreading of the disease. The rationale of vacci-
nation and mass culling should be carefully evaluated.
Key elements to be taken into account by decision
makers include the eﬃciency of veterinary surveil-
lance systems in place, the economic impact, and the
export policy of the country. An evaluation tool
called ‘Performance, Vision and Strategy’ has been
developed by the OIE to help in the identiﬁcation of
such key elements and in the design of investment
programmes to reinforce them if necessary. Countries
which are able to rapidly detect, contain and eradicate
the disease based on eﬃcient surveillance system
and control measures should continue with the
stamping-out of infected ﬂocks, following OIE rec-
ommendations [2]. Stamping-out could also be as-
sociated with preventive vaccination depending on the
risk of introduction of the disease. In February 2006,
France applied a strict stamping-out policy to contain
an outbreak of H5N1 AIV along with a nationwide
preventive vaccination of birds that could not be
contained indoors because there was a high risk of
introduction of H5N1 AIV by migratory birds.
Countries where the disease is becoming or likely to
become endemic, should conduct a universal vac-
cination programme [2]. In 2005 Vietnam and P.R.
China began universal vaccination programmes
against H5N1 AIV following the introduction of the
virus in 2003. However, because of the presence of
billions of backyard poultry, vaccination remains
diﬃcult to implement for practical and economic
reasons.
Advantages of vaccination
AI vaccines increase host resistance to AI disease by
inducing a strong immune response through the pro-
duction of neutralizing antibodies against AIV [13].
Moreover, AI vaccines reduce virus shedding and
therefore limit contact transmission. In their trans-
mission experiments, van der Goot et al. have shown
that more virus load is needed to infect a vaccinated
animal [16]. This experiment also demonstrated that
vaccinated animals excreted less or no detectable viral
particles (depending on the vaccine eﬃcacy), therefore
reducing the risk of contact infection within ﬂocks
[16, 61]. Mexico was able to contain an HPAI out-
break and eradicate the HPAI virus by using vacci-
nation along with strict biosecurity measures in 1995
[58] ; vaccination against an H5N1 AI outbreak in-
terrupted virus transmission in Hong Kong in 2002
[15]. However, most of the vaccines currently in use
have only been validated in the laboratory to prove
their eﬃcacy both in terms of resistance to infection
and reduction of viral shedding (Table 3). Their
ﬁeld eﬃcacy could often be impaired because of
the immunodeﬁciency of the hosts due to many
circulating diseases. Eﬃcient vaccines for waterfowl
also remain an issue especially in countries such as
Vietnam [62].
Issues related to vaccination
The quality of AI vaccines is aﬀected by many factors
including antigenicity of the vaccine strain, route of
administration, procedures in vaccine production,
vaccine formulation and antigen mass present in the
vaccine and vaccine preservation [63, 64]. Although
AI vaccines could protect a bird or a ﬂock from
clinical diseases, as described above AI vaccines could
only partially reduce virus shedding and the bird or
the ﬂock might still spread the virus (see section on AI
vaccine eﬃcacy) [19, 64].
Furthermore, AI vaccines may promote the selec-
tion of mutation in the circulating virus and thereby
perpetuate the risk of infection in the original species
or in another. For example, the H5N2 vaccines that
have been used in Mexico since 1995 might be, among
other factors, at the origin of an antigenic drift of the
ﬁeld virus away from the vaccine strain [54]. If this
were to occur, the vaccine protective eﬃcacy would be
impaired in time and the use of this speciﬁc vaccine
strain would eventually become obsolete. For these
reasons an eﬃcient monitoring of circulating virus
within vaccinated ﬂocks is essential. This represents a
major constraint for developing countries due to
economic and practical limitations.
Validation of vaccines in the ﬁeld is often species
speciﬁc, i.e. most of the AI vaccines have been
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validated in the ﬁeld in chickens and turkeys but little
is known about their ﬁeld eﬃcacy in other species
such as ducks and geese. Ducks have been identiﬁed
as a potential asymptotic carrier of the virus [65].
Most of the inactivated AI vaccines have a limited
eﬃcacy in ducks [34]. However, RG vaccines are
already in use in the ﬁeld for vaccination of ducks but
require twice the antigenic load used for chickens and/
or the addition of a strong stimulator for the immune
response to be eﬀective (oil-adjuvanted recombinant
vaccines) [18]. Vaccine quality control and pilot ﬁeld
trials are not widely performed within developing
countries as this requires speciﬁc equipment and ﬁ-
nancial resources.
A major limitation of vaccination is the need to be
able to diﬀerentiate between infected and vaccinated
animals (DIVA). When homologous vaccines are
used, both infected and vaccinated animals carry
antibodies to the same virus subtype. However, sim-
ple practical techniques exist to distinguish infected
from non-infected vaccinated birds such as the use
of sentinel birds (unvaccinated animals). In the case
of recombinant vaccines, they do not induce anti-
bodies against matrix or nuclear proteins of the
AIV, therefore simple ELISA or AGID tests can
be performed to apply the DIVA strategy [10].
Although these techniques seems relatively simple
and easy to implement in industrialized countries,
their use in developing countries is greatly impaired
because of practical and socio-economic issues
[3, 62].
When heterologous vaccines are used, anti-NA
antibodies speciﬁc to the ﬁeld virus and diﬀerent
from the vaccine strain may be detected. However,
their use could be impaired in areas where LPAI
viruses with NA similar to the vaccine strain might be
circulating. To date, the DIVA method using the
heterologous NA test has only been applied in Italy
although heterologous vaccines have been used
worldwide [37].
Under the OIE initiative, a disease-free zone could
be created by selective use of vaccine and the area
could regain some export capacity. However, de-
veloping countries practicing AI vaccination such as
Vietnam do not yet consider it to be a feasible option
because thorough surveillance, traceability and sam-
pling protocols would be required. DIVA testing is
considered to be too laborious and costly to im-
plement and recovery of export capacities is of sec-
ondary importance to the control of the disease and
public health issues.
Vaccination strategies
Diﬀerent vaccination strategies could be applied ac-
cording to the infectivity level of a country [66, 67].
(1) Preventive vaccination should be used in a
country free of disease but at high risk of intro-
duction of the disease. All birds at high risk
should be vaccinated. France, The Netherlands
and Switzerland recently vaccinated zoo birds and
other birds which could not be easily contained
due to the threat of H5N1 infection in migratory
bird areas. In Europe preventive and emergency
vaccination against HPAI are authorized under
some circumstances (EU Council Directive 2005/
94/EC). This strategy implies a major cost-beneﬁt
issue for developing countries where vaccination
against circulating diseases such as Newcastle
disease is not properly in place.
(2) Emergency vaccination should be conducted
during an outbreak. All unaﬀected animals within
and around an outbreak quarantine zone should
be vaccinated. The size of the vaccination zone
depends on the transmission rate and initial
spread during the high-risk period and should be
deﬁned within the contingency plan by pro-
fessionals and/or national and international
authorities. As protective immunity takes a mini-
mum of 2 weeks to develop, the eﬃcacy of this
strategy depends on various factors including
vaccine availability and the feasibility of rapid
administration. This represents a major limitation
for developing countries. There is a strong need to
develop vaccine banks by international bodies
such as OIE and FAO, to provide eﬃcient vac-
cines to developing countries and to ensure their
delivery to remote areas or poor countries.
Preventive vaccination should be used in coordi-
nation with emergency vaccination within a
country if the risk of virus dissemination is high.
(3) Prophylactic vaccination should be applied when
the disease has become endemic. Birds are vacci-
nated systematically against the same HA subtype
of the virus circulating in poultry to obtain a
minimum protective level within the ‘at-risk’
population. The ﬁnal goal of the approach is to
control (and to eradicate when possible) the
disease within the country. This could be a long-
term vaccination plan which should be applied
nationwide on all commercial and backyard
poultry. Strict control measures including stamp-
ing-out should be applied to aﬀected ﬂocks to
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better coordinate this approach. Once the
disease is controlled, biosecurity measures and
stamping-out can achieve eradication. This strat-
egy also implies major practical and cost-beneﬁt
issues for implementation by developing
countries.
Export bans linked to any of the vaccination
strategies are still a limitation for some countries. To
be eﬃcient a vaccination programme should involve
all the stakeholders including farmers, veterinarians
and decision makers. This should be an integrated
approach with awareness campaigns and proper
training, especially in countries where biosecurity
within the poultry production sector is limited.
Post-vaccination surveillance
Vaccine eﬃcacy and virus circulation within vacci-
nated ﬂocks should be monitored as recommended by
international authorities by using virological and im-
munological methods described below [10].
First, the protection conferred by the vaccination
campaign must be assessed. Protective immune re-
sponse, i.e. antibody levels against a ﬁeld virus, is
measured in sera from vaccinated animals by the HI
test [10]. Serum samples should be collected 2–3 weeks
post-vaccination (Table 4a, Fig. 1).
A serological conversion of 70–80% of the vacci-
nated animals has been empirically considered by
Charles Nicolle as suﬃcient to confer protection to
the whole population [56]. Indeed, Nicolle’s law
analogous to the herd immunity threshold (HIT)
is greatly in use but would require experimental
validation under the AI context. HIT is based on
the evaluation of the rate of spread of the disease
measured by the basic reproductive numberR0, i.e. the
average number of secondary infections produced
by one infected individual introduced into a fully
susceptible population [68, 69]. Models designed to
calculate R0 and therefore HIT usually meet Nicolle’s
value [70]. However, more studies are needed to assess
the minimum coverage and seroconversion levels
required within a zone and/or AI-vaccinated birds
to confer protection against the disease; and so at
multiple epidemiological units (e.g. animals, farms,
villages). During the 2002 H5N2 vaccination cam-
paign, the Hong Kong Ministry of Agriculture re-
commended testing 10–20 serum samples per ﬂock
with the HI test at 1 month after the second vaccine
dose. A good seroconversion was achieved (>80%)
and no subsequent AI outbreak or virus isolation
were reported which proves that the vaccination
programme was eﬃcient and associated with other
control measures enabled control of the disease [38].
The main drawback to AI vaccination is that a
virus might circulate undetected which increases the
risk of subsequent outbreaks and/or antigenic drift of
the circulating virus, away from the vaccine strain. It
is recommended that unvaccinated birds or sentinels
(chickens or ducks) should be kept within each ﬂock
(minimum 10–20 birds per ﬂock) and distributed
randomly inside the ﬂock. Sentinels immediately will
show morbidity/mortality when HPAI is circulating;
they also will show antibodies if LPAI is in circulation
or if the birds do not show any clinical signs of HPAI
infection (e.g. some ducks) [diagnosis made by rapid
testing, Tables 4a, 4b ; Fig. 1, A(1) and B(1)] followed
by conﬁrmatory tests [Fig. 1, A(2) and B(2)]. In 2002,
the Hong Kong Agricultural Fisheries and Conser-
vation Department recommended the use of 30–60
sentinel birds per ﬂock, and the collection and test-
ing of sentinel serum samples every 30–45 days for
as long as the vaccination campaign continued [38].
A recent mathematical model has shown that a ﬂock
with 80% vaccinated birds increases the chance by
almost 20% of an undetected outbreak at the end of
the production cycle and cumulative infectiousness.
According to the model this situation does not apply
when sentinel birds are used [70], but this simulation
model has not been validated with any historical
data. Unfortunately, the use of sentinels is often
limited in developing countries for economic and
practical reasons associated with diﬃculties in iden-
tiﬁcation of unvaccinated birds within a ﬂock.
Furthermore, sentinel birds can not be used with
backyard poultry. All backyard chickens should be
Table 4a. Serological screening tests to measure
antibody levels in poultry serum
Test name (manufacturer) Ag Price* (US$/test)
Gold standard HI test HA <10 (global cost)
FlockCheck NP <2
(IDEXX Laboratories Inc.)
CK121 AI NP <2
(BioChek)
ProFlock NP NK
(Synbiotics)
Ag, Antigen detected; HA, haemagglutinin; NK, not
known; NP, nucleoprotein.
* 2007 prices, manufacturers’ information.
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vaccinated to build a protection zone in high-risk
areas. Any unvaccinated backyard birds could be a
potential virus reservoir which already poses a prob-
lem in Asian countries practising vaccination and
which may pose a problem in Africa. In numerous
developing countries, the poultry production system
is mainly backyard poultry production. Under these
circumstances, virus circulation may remain un-
noticed. However, the role of backyard poultry in
maintaining and spreading the infection has been
questioned as this production sector appears to be less
at risk than the semi-commercial sector (100–10000
heads) with poor biosecurity level [3].
To increase the surveillance level, swabs and/or
serum samples from random animals in the ﬂock
could also be tested regularly by polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) test which detects AI nucleoprotein
genes or HA genes (Fig. 1). The PCR test applied to
ﬁeld samples has a high sensitivity (95.6%) and
speciﬁcity (96.3%) compared to conventional virus
isolation (VI) procedures (Table 4b) [71], but it re-
quires special equipment, laboratory supplies, and
well-trained test conductors. Rapid diagnosis tests
have less sensitivity and speciﬁcity than PCR tests
(Table 4b) [72] but they are convenient and easy to use
when an outbreak has been declared and the virus
previously identiﬁed using conventional methods such
as VI followed by PCR on puriﬁed concentrated viral
samples [10] (Fig. 1). At ﬁrst Vietnam used such tests
to diagnose AI within sick ﬂocks, however, the high
cost and sensitivity has been a real issue, therefore the
Vietnamese authorities no longer recommend the use
of such rapid tests.
Vaccine supply
The main AI vaccine manufacturers are located in
the United States, Mexico, The Netherlands, France,
and P.R. China (Table 3). To date, pharmaceutical
companies in the United States produce AI vaccines
based on demand and do not hold any stocks [42].
The orders are processed on a case-to-case basis and a
few months’ delay could occur before the delivery of
the ﬁnal product. This is also the case for most of
the manufacturers worldwide as until now vaccines
against AI were not recommended for general use.
Homologous or heterologous vaccines
VIRUS CIRCULATION VACCINE EFFICACY
Sentinels
Dead
Swab
Swab collection
(1) Influenza A
nucleoprotein detection
(2) Confirmation
infection
Virus Isolation (VI)
HA, NA typing
RT-PCR for H5 and H7
NA, NS
antibodies
AGID, HI
(2) Confirmation
Antibody results
DIVA testingVirus
identification
Conventional tests
Neg Pos
Rapid tests
Serum
Pos Nog
(1) Anti-nucleoprotein
antibody detection
Serum collectionAlive
Flocks
A B
Fig. 1. Flowchart of diagnosis tests for post-vaccination surveillance. (A), Virus circulation and (B), vaccine eﬃcacy could be
monitored by rapid tests and conﬁrmed by conventional tests : agar gel immunodiﬀusion assay (AGID); haemagglutinin
inhibition test (HI); reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction test (RT–PCR).
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Since the beginning of the Asian epidemic in 2003,
recommendations have been made by international
organizations (OIE, WHO) to vaccine manufacturers
and aﬀected countries to create a vaccine bank and to
allow individual states to stockpile AI vaccines for
emergency use [73].
In January 2006, France ordered 30 million doses
of AI vaccine from two manufacturers (Intervet, The
Netherlands and Fort Dodge, USA) for preventive
vaccination purposes; Russia is planning to produce
1.2 billion doses of AI vaccine annually and 6 millions
doses were delivered in 2007 to provinces in southern
Russia; the Nigerian government plans to acquire 1
million doses of AI vaccine because of the recent out-
breaks. With the rapid spreading of the H5N1 virus
since the beginning of the year 2006, the list of coun-
tries stockpiling AI vaccines constantly is increasing.
P.R. China has produced billions of doses of vac-
cines to be used in mainland China and for export to
the South East Asian countries of Vietnam and
Indonesia. Over 10 regional vaccine companies or re-
gional veterinary research institutes coordinated and
supervised by China National Harbin Veterinary
Research Institute are producing AI vaccines. Local
production of vaccines should be considered for
countries where the disease is endemic to ensure a
constant vaccine supply and ﬁnancial independence
from the international markets.
Economic aspects of the implementation of AI
vaccination
The choice of implementing vaccination should
also be considered from an economic perspective.
Cost-eﬀectiveness and cost-beneﬁt analyses should
be conducted to determine direct costs (e.g. price of
doses, administration) and indirect costs (post-
vaccination surveillance, commercial losses, export
bans, etc.) before the implementation of vaccination
[74, 75].
Parameters to be taken into account include:
’ Development status of poultry production systems
(commercial vs. backyard production; e.g. 99%
backyard poultry in Ethiopia and Cambodia;
Table 4b. Characteristics of diagnostic tests to detect presence of Inﬂuenza A virus (antigen detection) in ﬁeld
samples (cloacal or thracheal swabs)
Test name (manufacturer) Ag Time
Sensitivity
(%)
Speciﬁcity
(%)
Detection limit
EID50/ml
Price range*
(US$/test)
Gold Standard: Virus — 2–3 wk 100 100 100 >15
Isolation (VI) test
One step RT–PCR kit NP Few hours 95.6 96.3 102–104 1–2
(ImmTech Inc.) HA (93.1–98.0)# (94.4–98.1)#
Real time RT–PCR NP Few hours 93.3 98.4 101–102 <1
(RRT–PCR) kit HA (90.4–96.3)# (97.2–99.6)#
(ImmTech Inc.)
AI ELISA kit NP Few hours 90–95c 96$ 300–103 <5
(ImmTech Inc.)
Vet-smart AIV NP 10 min 90$ 100c 105–107 <7
(Rockeby Biomed Ltd)
Directigen1 NP 15 min 88.9 95.7 104 <2
(Becton Dickinson) (85.2–92.6)# (93.7–97.7)#
AIV Ag NP 20–30 min 77.3$ 100$ 105 <6
(SD Bioline)
Flu Detect NP 15 min 76–93$ 98$ 103–104 <10
(Synbiotics)
Innova Flu-A. NP 10–15 min 70$ 99.5$ NK <3
(Innova Thailand)
CK310 H5 30$ 100$ NK NK
(BioCheck)
Ag, Antigen detected; EID, embryo infective dose (lethality 50%); wk, weeks; HA, haemagglutinin; min, minutes; NK, not
known; NP, nucleoprotein.
* 2007 prices, manufacturers’ information.
# Independent validation study [72].
$ Manufacturer’s data.
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60% backyard and 40% commercial in Nigeria
and Vietnam and 90% commercial in Thailand).
’ Direct vaccination costs (‘needle in bird’ cost in-
cluding price of vaccine per dose; administration
and storage; post-vaccination monitoring; aware-
ness campaign) [74, 76].
’ Indirect vaccination costs (e.g. potential drop in
poultry market prices) including economic losses
due to reduction of exporting capacity. The rates of
indirect costs could greatly vary from one country
to another according to the development status of
the poultry sector [75].
Consideration of export bans are only relevant for
industrialized countries relying on poultry exports as
an important income. The indirect costs linked to ex-
port bans for countries using AI vaccination could be
controlled by applying vaccination based on a DIVA
strategy. As previously mentioned, a country could
recover its full exportation capacity if there is suf-
ﬁcient evidence of no contamination in vaccinated
ﬂocks, depending on the requirements of inter-
national authorities. In 2001, Italy was able to recover
its poultry trade capacity while using a H7N3 het-
erologous vaccine against a H7N1 LPAI outbreak by
applying the iFat technique to detect infected from
non-infected birds within the vaccinated population
[19]. However, this is not a priority for countries such
as Vietnam or Indonesia where between 60–90% of
the poultry population is reared backyard.
Most of the economic studies on AI have so far
concentrated on the impact of the disease, more
studies are needed to assess the impact of its control
measures both in term of sustainability and eﬃcacy
[77, 78]. For developing countries such as Vietnam
and Indonesia, considerations are focused on small-
scale poultry producers who rely on the poultry mar-
ket as their main livelihood [60]. Epidemiological
models including economic aspects are needed to es-
timate the cost-beneﬁt of a vaccination campaign and
to compare the cost vs. beneﬁt of diﬀerent available
strategies prior to implementation. Such models
would help decision makers in their choice of the best
strategy to implement according to the speciﬁc socio-
economic context of the country/zone [79].
FIELD EXPERIENCE IN RELATION TO
THE USE OF AI VACCINES
AI vaccines have been used in Mexico, Italy,
Pakistan, and the United States to control LPAI.
Previous to the HPAI H5N1 outbreak in South East
Asia (2003), only a few attempts to control HPAI
outbreaks by the means of vaccination have been
reported: the HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Mexico
(1994) and the HPAI H7N3 outbreak in Pakistan
(2003) [57, 58]. Table 5 presents a synthetic review of
the AI vaccination strategies used in the ﬁeld accord-
ing to the country and the type of AI virus (HP or LP)
and a brief summary of the outcome of the vacci-
nation campaigns.
Homologous vs. heterologous vaccines
Homologous AI vaccines against H1 and H7 LPAI
outbreaks have been used in commercial turkey ﬂocks
within localized areas in the United States since the
1980s [42]. These strategic vaccination campaigns
have been successful at either controlling or eradicat-
ing the disease by prophylactic vaccination and/or
emergency vaccination respectively. The choice of
using vaccination or mass culling could be made eas-
ily in high-density poultry areas in which export bans
were not an issue for consideration. The safe and ef-
ﬁcient use of homologous vaccination for turkeys was
monitored by veterinary services and surveillance
systems that were established previously in the
country [42]. A DIVA vaccination strategy was
planned against the 2003 H7N2 outbreak in the
United States but the disease was eradicated before
the heterologous H7N3 vaccine was used. A similar
scenario was successful in Italy to eradicate LPAI of
H7N1 subtype by using heterologous H7N3 vaccine
in 2000. In order to apply the DIVA strategy [80],
the Italian reference laboratory developed an ad hoc
diagnostic test capable of detecting N1 subtype NA
antibodies in serum samples based on ﬂuorescent
immunoreactions. Due to the use of heterologous
vaccines and the eﬀective implementation of a DIVA
strategy, the country was able to recover its expor-
tation capacity by practising vaccination [17].
However, as previously mentioned, the use of an
heterologous vaccine as part of a DIVA strategy to
limit economic losses is neither a priority nor practical
to implement in many developing countries as DIVA
testing can be laborious, expensive and sampling
procedures diﬃcult to implement.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the eﬃcacy
of heterologous vaccines could be limited according
to the genetic similarities with the challenge strain
(see section on AI vaccine eﬃcacy). Although no
published ﬁeld data are yet available to conﬁrm
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experimental ﬁndings one could also expect limited
eﬃcacy against challenge in the ﬁeld. The current
priority for developing countries infected with H5N1
AI virus is to control the disease in an eﬃcient
manner. Therefore the choice for an heterologous
vaccination as part of a DIVA strategy is not a
priority for most of the currently H5N1-infected
countries [81].
On the other hand, when control measures are not
applied properly to coordinate the vaccination cam-
paigns, the use of homologous vaccines could have a
negative impact on the genetic evolution of the ﬁeld
Table 5. Avian inﬂuenza vaccination campaign established in countries
Vaccine
strain
Outbreak virus
strain
Vaccination strategy
(period)
Result
(last reported case) Ref.
Country (vaccine source)
P.R. China (Harbin Veterinary Research Institute; local companies)
H5N1 H5N1 (HPAI) Prophylactic Not eradicated [31]
H5N2 (2003 to present) (Jan. 2008)
Fowlpox H5
Hong Kong (Nobilis inﬂuenza, Intervet ; Chinese vaccines, Harbin Veterinary Institute)
H5N2 H5N1 (HPAI) Emergency Controlled [15, 38, 85]
H5N1 Prophylactic Eradicated
Preventive (2003)
(2003 to present)
Indonesia (Vaksindo+two other local manufacturers ; Chinese vaccines, Harbin Veterinary Institute ; Nobilis Inﬂuenza,
Intervet ; Gallimune, Merial)
H5N1 H5N1 (HPAI) Prophylactic Not eradicated [91, 104]
H5N2 (2003 to present) (endemic)
H5N9
North/South Korea (Vaksindo, Indonesia; Avimex, Mexico)
H5N1 H5N1 (HPAI) Prophylactic Eradicated
H5N2 (2003) (2005)
Vietnam (Chinese vaccines, Harbin Vet Institute; Nobilis Inﬂuenza, Intervet ; Gallimune ﬂu, Merial)
H5N1 H5N1 (HPAI) Prophylactic Not eradicated
H5N2 (2005 to present) (Jan 2008)
H5N9
Mexico (Avimex; Nobilis inﬂuenza, Intervet ; TROVAC, Merial)
H5N2 H5N2 (HPAI) Emergency (1994) HPAI Eradicated (1995) [54, 58, 105]
Fowlpox H5 H5N2 (LPAI) Prophylactic (1995 to present) LPAI Not controlled (present)
Italy (Nobilis inﬂuenza Intervet ; BioFlu, Merial)
H7N3 H7N1 (LPAI) Emergency Eradicated [14, 37, 82, 106]
H5/H7 H7N3 (LPAI) (2000–2003) (2004)
Prophylactic
(2004)
Preventive
(2004–ongoing)
Pakistan (Nobilis inﬂuenza, Intervet ; Fluvac, Merial ; local production)
H7N3* H7N3 (HPAI) Emergency HPAI Eradicated [57]
H7N3*# H7N3 (LPAI) (2003–2004) LPAI Not controlled
H9N2*# H9N2 (LPAI) Prophylactic (present)
H7/H9*# H7N3 (HPAI) (2004 to present)
USA (North Carolina, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Connecticut) (Lohman Animal Health; Fort Dodge)
H1N1 H1N1 (LPAI) Prophylactic Eradicated [42, 83]
H1N2 H1N2 (LPAI) (1980–1997) (2003)
H7N3 H7N3 (LPAI) Emergency
H7N2 H7N2 (LPAI) (1995, 2002, 2003)
H7N3 H7N2 (LPAI)
* Aqueous-based vaccine.
# Oil-based vaccine.
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virus. Indeed, Mexico has been using extensive vacci-
nation to control LPAI H5N2 epidemics since 1995
without any success to date [58]. Even worse, genetic
studies on the evolution of the circulating virus have
demonstrated an antigenic drift away from the vac-
cine strain [54]. As the virus is undergoing mutation
due to vaccine pressure the threat of LPAI virus mu-
tation into a HPAI strain remains important [58, 82,
83]. Therefore careful attention should be paid to the
genetic evolution of the ﬁeld virus strain away from
the vaccine strain. The vaccine strain should be up-
dated when necessary to maintain its eﬃcacy against
challenge in the ﬁeld [84].
Vaccination against H5N1, the Asian experience
SAR Hong Kong has been using vaccination against
H5N1 since the 2002 epidemic [3, 15, 38, 85–87]. All
chickens were vaccinated with inactivated H5N2
vaccine in 2002–2006. Unvaccinated sentinel poultry
were used in commercial ﬂocks and ducks were sep-
arated from chickens in live-bird markets. At ﬁrst, the
virus continued to spread within vaccinated ﬂocks
with a low mortality rate 9–18 days post-vaccination,
however, after 18 days (the minimum onset time for
vaccine to confer protection) there were no more
deaths within vaccinated ﬂocks. Moreover, there
was no evidence of asymptomatic shedding of the
virus [38]. Vaccination programmes and biosecurity
measures have proved to be eﬀective as no outbreak
was reported from 2004 until the present time whereas
a number of outbreaks occurred in adjacent regions of
mainland China, Thailand, and Vietnam [3].
Emergency vaccination for commercial and back-
yard poultry was conducted to contain the widely
spread H5N1 outbreaks in P.R. China in 2004. State
agricultural agencies established a plan to conduct
universal vaccination in 2005 [3]. However, the dis-
ease was not contained and new outbreaks have oc-
curred in several regions of China since early 2006
[88]. A study conducted in 2004–2005 showed that
unvaccinated asymptomatic chickens and ducks in
some Chinese markets were infected with H5N1 virus
[65]. The existence of such ‘silent carriers or excretors’
is dangerous because they become the virus reservoir
and shed the virus into their environment, causing
potential outbreaks in commercial poultry and
threatening human health. However, only 0.6% of
the chickens were positive by virus detection which
could be due to a temporary infection in the market.
The ﬁndings in live-bird markets may not represent
the true situation in commercial ﬂocks. The vac-
cination campaign involving more than 5 billion
poultry – most of all backyard poultry – with cover-
age of only 20–50% has been suﬃcient to a certain
extent in containing the outbreaks or the circulation
of the virus. However, the presence of a new non-
pathogenic virus variant for ducks increases the risk
of new outbreaks within the poultry population
[65]. The appropriate application of the monitoring
systems such as sentinel birds, serology and viral
testing, is also under question. P.R. China has re-
cognized the need to improve eﬃcacy of the AI vac-
cines produced domestically in research institutes
and vaccine manufacturers. Nonetheless, the Chinese
government plans to provide free AI vaccines to
poultry producers and farmers to increase the vacci-
nation rate.
The situation between P.R. China and Hong
Kong is very diﬀerent for many reasons: the scale of
territory to be controlled; the heterogeneity between
Chinese regions in terms of poverty and level of
industrialization, and in particular the high number of
households still raising backyard poultry in mainland
P.R. China, compared with Hong Kong. In Hong
Kong the virus was eradicated in 1997 after the ﬁrst
outbreak when the authorities decided to cull all the
poultry within the territory, then strict biosecurity
measures where applied to prevent a new emergence of
the virus [86]. In P.R. China the situation is very dif-
ferent as the virus might be circulating in the environ-
ment (wild birds) and being maintained unnoticed
within unvaccinated backyard poultry [89]. China has
only reported a small number of human cases since the
start of the epidemics in 2003 (30 human cases since
2003 compared with 133 cases for Indonesia since
2005) which could reﬂect a controlled level of infected
animals (or a low reporting rate), probably because of
the large-scale vaccination campaign. However, given
the low transmission rate of this disease from birds
to humans, human cases act as ‘sentinels ’ for avian
infection and therefore still indicate a signiﬁcant virus
activity in China’s poultry population (so far three
human cases in China for 2008) [3].
In Indonesia, vaccination has been implemented
since 2005 using mostly Chinese and locally produced
inactivated H5N1 and H5N2 vaccines but a high
number of H5N1 outbreaks in unvaccinated ﬂocks
have been reported since early 2006 [90]. Initially, the
Indonesian government wanted to apply universal
vaccination, but due to budget limitations, only stra-
tegic vaccination was conducted in regions where the
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disease was endemic [91]. The uncontrolled situation
currently faced by the Indonesian government might
be explained by the speciﬁc geographical and
economic context of Indonesia. The insular organiz-
ation of the country has created an ‘autonomous’ era
of the veterinary services and a common policy is
diﬃcult to implement [91]. Moreover a limited supply
of vaccines due to budget constraints has also im-
paired the vaccination campaigns [91].
Vietnam used European and Chinese vaccines for
a pilot vaccination campaign in the summer of
2005. Later, only Chinese RG H5N1 and TROVAC
(1-day-old chicks, industrial sector) vaccines were
used for universal vaccination. Vietnamese authorities
approved the import of AI vaccines from China after
they conducted all required quality control tests.
The ﬁrst round of vaccination was completed in all
chickens (around 160 millions doses, twice a year).
A post-vaccination surveillance programme has been
implemented and serum samples were collected in
some ﬂocks and tested in state laboratories [92].
Data showed that in some areas the vaccination
coverage rate was closer to 60% with only 60% of
seroconversion of vaccinated animals which could
bring the protection level of the poultry population
down to 40% in some provinces [39, 92]. Low
levels of seroconversion could be a result of poorly
administered or preserved vaccines. From the thou-
sands of poultry swab samples collected within
the country, only a few tested positive by RRT–
PCR [39]. Nonetheless, no outbreaks within the vac-
cinated poultry population were reported following
the ﬁrst year of vaccination (from December
2005 to December 2006). And no human cases were
reported in Vietnam until 2007. All the new cases of
H5N1 AIV infection reported recently were all in
unvaccinated ducks and geese [93, 94]. This new
wave of outbreaks (March–July 2007) is simultaneous
with the lift of the ban on duck hatching and the
end of the rice-ﬁeld season when ducks are allowed to
free range on ﬁeld paddies [95]. These new outbreaks
emphasize the need for a comprehensive waterfowl
vaccination strategy and the development of water-
fowl-speciﬁc eﬃcient vaccines. Muscovy ducks have
been vaccinated since 2007 with European H5N9
vaccine but no post-vaccination monitoring data have
yet become available. Moreover, the vaccination
campaign might have helped the virus spread from
one farm to another [96]. A comprehensive AI sur-
veillance system to eﬃciently monitor virus circu-
lation in vaccinated ﬂocks still is needed as the use of
sentinels and virological monitoring is not properly
applied [97].
DISCUSSION
AI vaccination alone can not be used to eradicate the
disease. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to predict the eﬃcacy of a
vaccine with respect to reduction in virus shedding
and therefore its impact alone on the transmission
dynamics of the disease [42]. In countries where
poultry is mainly backyard scavenger poultry,
optimum vaccination coverage might be diﬃcult to
achieve. Furthermore, if an antigenic drift occurs due
to vaccine pressure [54], the vaccine may still prevent
the host from showing clinical disease but fail to stop
or reduce virus shedding by the host. To eﬀectively
control the virus from circulating in poultry, an ef-
ﬁcient post-vaccination surveillance programme
should be established. This appears to be the main
challenge for developing countries in the use of vac-
cination against AI.
An eradication programme should include strict
quarantine, movement controls on animals and
equipment, increased biosecurity, extensive surveil-
lance, and a comprehensive education programme for
the public.
Until recently, AI vaccines have not been used
extensively and research was limited (around four
publications per year on AI vaccines for the past 40
years against 120 per year since 2004). Although
H5N1 vaccines have been extensively used in
Asia since 2004, Chinese manufacturers have been
covering most of the market needs and other inter-
national companies have not felt the need to focus
research on the optimization of current vaccines.
The ideal vaccine for tropical countries needs to be a
single dose, stable at room temperature and eﬃcient
in multiple species ; none of the current AI vaccines
meet any of these standards. However, numerous
experimental AI vaccines are under development
such as a recombinant vaccine based on baculovirus
vector [98] or DNA vaccines [99]. Eradication of
the disease within a poultry population will not be
achieved if eﬀective vaccines are not available for
waterfowl.
New concerns recently have arisen regarding the
illegal use of vaccines obtained from ‘underground’
or ‘black’ markets. The illegal use of AI vaccines has
been reported in some countries where vaccination
against AI is still prohibited [90] ; fake vaccines con-
taining only cows’ milk were sold to farmers and used
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on chickens in some countries [100]. A thorough con-
trol and communication programme on the beneﬁts
and limits of AI vaccination needs to be developed
quickly and put in place.
AI vaccinemarkets are expanding.More developing
countries are planning to produce their own vaccine to
meet domestic need. Vietnam is making and testing its
own AI vaccine to become independent on supply
and to ensure the availability of the vaccine for a rapid
response to an outbreak. However, it is diﬃcult for a
small country to compete with international pharma-
ceutical companies in the AI vaccine markets.
CONCLUSION
Through the Asian experience, it has become clear
that AI vaccination would play an essential part in the
control of the actual H5N1 pandemic in developing
countries. To prevent any negative impact of illegal
vaccination, international and national authorities
must react quickly by implementing national vacci-
nation strategies, especially in Africa where the ﬁrst
H5N1 outbreaks were declared in January 2006. The
risk that the poultry industry and consumers will lose
trust in vaccine safety and eﬃcacy also is a concern.
This would make the application of ﬁeld vaccination
even more diﬃcult. Uncontrolled vaccination, in-
cluding the improper distribution and administration
of a vaccine and/or the use of bad vaccines, poses a
greater threat in further outbreaks and raises the
possibility of the potential mutation of the virus to
become a pandemic pathogen.
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